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Abstract 
By comparing the historical recalibration of the myth of the Mother 
of the Gods in Athens with the scholarly construction of the 
mysteries in nineteenth and twentieth century religio-historical 
scholarship, this essay argues that just as primary practitioners of 
religious discourse engage in religious mythmaking, so too do 
scholars of religion. Both the practice of religion and scholarship on 
religion subsist in the political domain of social discourse and 
mythmaking. However, the two kinds of mythmaking are not simply 
identical. It is the distance to the discourse afforded the scholar that 
enables scholarship as politically committed denaturalisation, or 
historicisation, of religious tradition and reflexive scholarship. 
 
“Isn’t scholarship just another instance of ideology in narrative 
form? Don’t scholars tell stories to recalibrate a pecking order, 
putting themselves, their favorite theories, and their favorite people 
on top?” ... “Isn’t logos just a repackaged mythos?” ... to which I 
now respond: ‘If myth is ideology in narrative form, then scholarship 




1. SITUATING REFLEXIVE DISCOURSE 
Religio-historical study of early Christianity is currently characterised by 
intellectual ferment that has far-reaching consequences. This is partly due, 
arguably, to seismic shifts in the study of religion with new theories, new re-
                                                     
1 The citation is from the “Epilogue: Scholarship as myth” and preserves a dialogue with an 
astute student questioning Lincoln’s narrative of the scholarship on myth as itself another 
instance of myth, which on reflection prompted the answer “scholarship is myth with 
footnotes.” 
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evaluations of older theoretical work and scholarly traditions, and generally, 
new applications of these to fields previously insulated from these 
developments and study fields, gaining currency in academic discourse. The 
discipline New Testament Studies, of course, did not remain unaffected. While 
the development of new methods of reading New Testament texts has been 
an important feature in scholarship of the last three decades or so, 
increasingly the discipline itself is being reconceptualised so that more and 
more, New Testament studies is reconfigured as early Christian studies, with 
all the attendant implications pertaining to such a revisioning. Moreover, 
academic discourse is increasingly characterised by rigorous self-reflexivity, 
so that the processes of inquiry themselves become part of the object of 
inquiry, and in fact, help constitute the primary object of inquiry, which in our 
case is early Christianity. The argument pursued in this essay takes issue with 
these broader developments and the intellectual context in which inquiry into 
early Christianity takes place. This essay originated as part of a research 
seminar held in the Department of New Testament on the topic “New Ways of 
Inquiry into Early Christianity”.2 The context in which these deliberations were 
set, is created by two distinct, yet related, elements announced in the theme 
of the seminar, namely “New Ways of Inquiry”, and “Early Christianity”. On the 
face of it, the first clearly denotes the type of discourse pertaining to a meeting 
such as this, namely this is a reflection on the nature of scholarly or academic 
inquiry. The second phrase evokes the field of practice of a living religion, 
Christianity, and in particular, the early formative stages of Christianity. The 
first implies a rupture in analytical praxis, though in the suggestive form of 
“new ways”, an announcement of a new/different politics of analysis. The 
second already betrays an ideological orientation, namely that the disciplinary 
praxis concerns itself with a historical phenomenon primarily.3 
 The formulation “field of practice of a living religion” is deliberate. It 
points to the fact that the study of religion derives, for the most part, its 
justification from the world-making, socially formative, and culturally 
symbolising effect of this particular discourse we ordinarily label “Christian 
religion”.4 That we adduce significance to the early formative stages of 
                                                     
2 The seminar was held on 17 May 2007 at the University of South Africa, and the programme 
consisted of four papers: Jurie H le Roux, “The possibilities and challenges of New Testament 
scholarship in South Africa”; Gerhard van den Heever, “Undoing the sleights of hand: 
Prophets and scholars – Two mythic discourses”; Johannes N Vorster, “The rhetoric of the 
body and its usefulness for the study of early Christianity”; and Pieter J J Botha, “Considering 
‘religious life’ in the world of the early Christians”. 
 
3 A view I am sympathetic of, although I also want to extend the conceptualisation of the issue 
into a somewhat more encompassing discourse analysis and theorising. 
 
4 This hold true, even when Christianity is studied in institutional settings that on the face of it 
purport to practise “neutral” study of religion (see the article by Don Wiebe referred to below). 
For the greater part of the institutionalised disciplinary study of Christianity, a theological base 
ideology governs the disciplinary praxis. 
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“Christian religion” (i. e. to the period delimited by the corpus of Christian 
writings now canonised as “New Testament”, roughly the late first century CE, 
or the “earliest church”) is equally instructive, for this is not a natural given. 
Rather, it is the result of a particular set of cultural and historical 
developments not shared with the greater part of the history of the Christian 
tradition, nor with a very sizable section of contemporary Christian 
communities. It is, in addition, by now a truism to refer in this regard to the 
effects of Renaissance (and Reformation period) and early Modern calls for 
humanist, historicist interpretation of religious tradition, “ad fontes”, and which 
formed the groundswell of the later (in the Occidental world) so dominant 
mode of inquiry: “historical” in its many manifestations – historical-
grammatical, historical-critical, religio-historical, socio-historical, et cetera. In 
short, neither the delineation of the object of study, Christian religion, as a 
substantive phenomenon, nor the focus on the period of origins as definitive, 
or even the requisite appropriate methodology for studying early Christian 
discourse, is a natural given. So, when viewed from a wider perspective, the 
issue that announces itself, is this: what defines the essence of a religious 
tradition, and on what grounds do we determine what this essence is? As well, 
what is the proper interpretive or analytical stance towards any such 
construction or imagined religious formation, and what purpose is served by 
such interpretive or analytical practices? 
 The answers to these questions are quite diverse, depending on the 
ideological position and localisation of the person who has to judge: it can 
range from an appeal to some (significant or canonical) stage of the history of 
that religious tradition, mostly/often the oldest phase of the originary vision (in 
our case, early Christianity or the New Testament period); or a particular 
canonical section of the tradition (e.g. Theravada vs Mahayana Buddhism, 
Protestant mainstream vs Catholic or Pentecostal Christianity); or it may 
include the whole of the developing tradition, inclusive of everything produced 
in its name, even so-called heterodox traditions (which term in this framework, 
of course, loses its explanatory meaning) (Pye 1973:1-58). However one 
wants to view the essence of the Christian tradition (to stay with only the one 
tradition forming the focus of this discussion), fact is our view (and here I 
mean both the view of practitioners of religion, as well as reflexive scholars of 
religion) is shaped not only by the particular position we occupy vis-à-vis the 
tradition, but also by the way the tradition has come to define itself in ever 
shifting and differentiating fashion during the long process of being continually 
moulded by the vicissitudes of its historical trajectories (Pye 1994; 2000). To 
put it in the terms now made fashionable by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence 
Ranger, religions are invented traditions (Hobsbawm 1983:1-14). Invention in 
this context denotes the rhetorical techniques involved in creating, 
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establishing and maintaining myth; the rhetorical nature of the construction of 
a narrative of identity; the selection of narratives and “pasts” from which to 
manufacture a history and world orientation; the arrangement of the 
narratives; their contextualisation and imbuing with values and importance 
and significance (Van den Heever 2004:208). In short, the formation of a 
religious tradition is a mythmaking enterprise. 
 Yet, Christian religious discourse is characterised and supported by 
claims to superhuman and supernatural origins – it is a revealed religion, that 
is, on its internal claims it is a sui generis discourse. Thus, Christian religious 
discourse speaks with a transcendental authority that is not derived from, and 
that is removed from, the contexts and forces that shaped its variable 
manifestations, even though all religious imagery and discourse, on the face 
of it seemingly innocuous, have social and political implications as symbolic 
speech acts and interventions (Lincoln 1983:151). To speak with such 
transcendental authority, the practitioners of religious discourses need to 
perform a sleight of hand, and this, quite simply, consists of transforming 
Culture into Nature, of occluding the cultural manufacturedness of itself and 
projecting itself as always having been thus, that is, as the (pre-)ordained 
nature of things characterised by the necessity of being just so. It resides in 
the occulting of the time-bound mutability or malleability of particular 
discourses in favour of eternal perspectives, immutability sub specie 
aeternitatis. As Bruce Lincoln puts it: 
 
... myths are not sacred narratives. Although many myths claim 
sacred status, in this they misrecognize their own nature, for they 
are human stories, like any other. They simply make more 
exaggerated claims to a more elevated kind of authority ... myths 
are not collective narratives or the speech of any group as a whole 
... in its details each variant advances the specific interests of those 
responsible for its production, revision, and circulation. These 
anonymous agents and absent authors misrepresent themselves – 
and those for whom they speak – as the group as a whole ... myths 
are neither false stories, nor true, but simply stories that claim to 




Announced, therefore, in the theme “New Ways of Inquiry into Early 
Christianity”, is a clash between two seemingly incompatible ways of 
speaking, namely one which resides in history and the other in eternity, the 
one emanating from the domain of culture, the other from the domain of 
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Nature. As Bruce Lincoln (2005:8) puts it in the first three of his (now quite 
famous and oft-quoted) “Theses on Method”, especially no 3: 
 
History of religions [as a method – GvdH] is thus a discourse that 
resists and reverses the orientation of that discourse with which it 
concerns itself. To practise history of religions in a fashion 
consistent with the discipline’s claim of title is to insist on discussing 
the temporal, contextual, situated, interested, human, and material 
dimensions of those discourses, practices, and institutions that 
characteristically represent themselves as eternal, transcendent, 
spiritual, and divine. 
 
Scholarly study of religion as a historical discipline has thus as its aim to 
denaturalise religious discourse and its attendant claims (or perhaps better, to 
historicise it), which is why scholarship on religion is concerned with such 
questions as the rhetoricity and embedded interestedness of (“religious”) 
symbolic interventions and projections (Lincoln 2005:8-9).  
 However, the picture is more complex, as suggested by thesis numbers 
7 and 8 of Lincoln: 
 
when scholars equally participate in portraying cultural and religious 
traditions as monolithic, harmoniously integrated social formations 
and religious discourses, as unchanging and stable traditions, and 
in doing so, replicate the ideological positions of privileged 
informants as if these voices speak for all the adherents of the 
given (section of) the tradition, scholars too transform a historic 
narrative into a religious one. In such a context scholarship 




This is what has happened for the greater part of modern scholarship on early 
Christian literature and the history of early Christianity. By taking as 
orientation principle the picture of Christian origins of Luke/Acts and Eusebius 
(the so-called “big bang” theory) and merely paraphrasing them, without 
considering deconstructing these with the aid of new theories of religion, 
discourse, and myth, generations of church historians and scholars of 
Christian religion remained captive to the rhetoric of Luke and Eusebius. In 
doing so, they merely ventriloquised the ideology and rhetoric embedded in 
these so foundational texts (Mack 2001:60). And yet there is more: even when 
the conventional picture of Christian origins was called in question by the new 
historical-critical and religio-historical methods of scholarly investigation into 
Christian origins and history, the “new history” was itself beholden to the 
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mythmaking interests characterising its period of birth and maturation (Van 
den Heever 1993:20-27).5 The ruptures in the interpretive tradition 
represented by the complex Renaissance-Reformation-Modernity (and now: 
Postmodernity?) were not occasioned from outside of the field of religious 
production, but rather were the result of recalibrations within the religious field 
of “first-order myth”. One can safely say that reimagining or redescribing 
Christian origins, or the countering of this in faith-serving academic work, is 
not so much a question of establishing the truth of “what really happened” as it 
is a social and political positioning vis-à-vis other groups and social formations 
drawing on different versions of myth and symbolic interventions (the political 
use of myth that Bruce Lincoln talks about, the clearest statement of this is in 
Mack [2001:177-199], “The Christian myth and the Christian nation”). Insofar 
as this social and political positioning is occluded, scholarship constructs itself 
as a species of mythmaking. 
 
2. TWO MYTHIC DISCOURSES 
The dual aspects of scholarship as myth on the one hand, and of the 
imposition of a “primary, originary” mythic discourse on the other, both as 
constitutive elements of social, cultural, and religious construction, announced 
in the cited epigraph, constitute the two poles straddled by the argument 
pursued in this essay. At heart “the troublesome and arduous work of 
imagining social formations and religious ‘constitutions’” in the context of 
religio-historical study is first and foremost concerned with the “field of 
scholarly production” (to coin a phrase in imitation of Pierre Bourdieu) as the 
matrixed – and “martricising” – collection and representation of social-religious 
data, and secondarily, with the imagining into being of religious social 
formations or institutions (or “constitutions” as I put it here) on the level of 
“everyday practice” (the quotidian toil of religious production, or the champs 
religieux Bourdieu talked about). Bourdieu has long pursued the making of a 
“reflexive sociology” which brings into purview both the object of 
perception/knowledge and the act of constructing the object. The “field” refers 
to the social circumstances conducive to, contributing to, and giving embodied 
form to the cultural artefacts produced within that context. As such the “field” 
also encompasses the embodied ideologies-in-contest and the interests of 
both producers of myth and religious discourse and authority, and the 
consumers/recipients of such religio-socio-cultural production (see inter alia 
                                                     
5 See also Mali (2003) for how the modern shape of history as both narrative and as 
academic discipline derives from mythic imaginings in the course of the 18th and 19th to early 
20th century. 
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Bourdieu 1968; 1984; 1988; 1992; 1993; and for a discussion of the term in 
Bourdieu, see McNay 1999:95-117).  
 What is important to keep in mind, though, is that these two – scholarly 
production and the imagining into being of religious social formations or 
institutions on the level of “everyday practice” – are not separate nor 
separable aspects of the scholarly toil, but the proverbial obverse and reverse 
of the same coin, not only mutually implicating each other but each existing 
insofar as it makes the other possible. They are each other’s enabling 
condition. But even this is too simplistic, for “everyday (religious) practice” is 
simultaneously folk practice and folk tradition on the level of popular religion,6 
the result of embodied mythmaking and performance as discourse 
construction and maintenance7 as well as the generative structuring of the 
habitus by the “mobilizing agents” in any social and cultural formation 
(Bourdieu 1977:78; McNay 1999:99, a reference to Pierre Bourdieu [1990], 
The logic of practice). “Disposition” or dispositif, a term related to habitus, is 
the rule generated, socially constructed affectively-laden body as medium for 
or site of the socially locative powerplay that occasions and arranges the 
positions occupied by the relevant embodied person and the resultant 
performances that go with the particular position.8 Included in the category 
“mobilising agency”, and only to focus for the purposes of this study on the 
field of religious production, one should see of course, are the multi-levelled 
and multi-hierarchised complex systems of authorising, spanning a continuum 
of horizontal and vertical relationships running from significant others such as 
parent vis-à-vis child, members of religious groups among themselves, local 
minister/priest/religious expert vis-à-vis local community, religious hierarchy or 
institutional bureaucracy, theologian-as-authoritative-insider-commentator, 
and the scholar-as-authoritative-analyst/theoriser. Each of these authorising 
institutions occupy a different and differentiated position in the social and 
                                                     
6 I mean this in the most generalised sense possible, as “what people do”. I am not intending 
an analysis of the terms “folk”, or “popular religion”, and fully aware of the nebulous and 
artificial character of these terms, I nevertheless use them to indicate the most general and 
basic field of religious toil, where “religion” is interwoven with the quotidian, the ordinary 
human ways of doing things. 
 
7 Bourdieu’s habitus, the embodied rules of – or better, rule conformance to – the social and 
cultural game/s: “a system of durable, transposable dispositions that mediates an individual’s 
actions and the external conditions of production”. 
 
8 Bourdieu (1977:81): “The habitus is precisely this immanent law, lex insita, laid down in each 
agent by his [sic] earliest upbringing, which is the precondition not only for the co-ordination of 
practices but also for practices of co-ordination, since the corrections and adjustments the 
agents themselves consciously carry out presuppose their mastery of a common code and 
since undertakings of collective mobilization cannot succeed without a minumum of 
concordance between the habitus of the mobilizing agents (e.g. prophet, party leader, etc) 
and the dispositions of those whose aspirations and world-view they express.” 
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religious field, each position marked by different investments from behaviour 
control and training (the inculcation of dispositifs and habitus through systems 
of education), to straightforward advocacy (religious ministries and theology), 
to reflexive and analytical praxis. 
 My argument is thus that both scholarly study of religion and the 
practice of religion are species of discourse and discourse-making, and 
therefore that both – although not of the same order – subsist in the political 
arena of social discourse and social formation. The exact distance of 
scholarship on religion, and religio-historical study, from the “everyday 
practice of religion” is the matter of contention. With particular sharpness 
Donald Wiebe has argued that the study of religion is/must be “a social 
science that must strive, as all scientific endeavor, to be free from religious, 
political, and ideological determination” (in reaction to Paul J Griffith [1999] 
Religious reading: The place of reading in the practice of religion) (Wiebe 
2001:334). According to Wiebe, in spite of pretensions to the contrary, even in 
learned societies such as the American Academy of Religion with its 
profession of “a nonreligious scholarly agenda in the study of religion in the 
academic context” the presidential addresses to the Academy demonstrated 
the “‘message’ of its official leaders was indistinguishable from the religiously 
orientated messages of the presidential addresses delivered to the NABI (i.e. 
National Association of Bible Instructors – GvdH) ... precisely the kind one 
finds in formal theological contexts” (Wiebe 2006:275). Even phenom-
enological studies of religion are characterised by an essential religious nature 
(see the extensive discussion in Flood 1999). 
 This is not to say that scholarly study of religion and the practice of 
religion are to be identified in a facile manner (or in fact, can be), but merely to 
point out that scholarly discourse and analysis is equally not born sui generis, 
but generated in the crucible of political kairos, beholden to social ideologies, 
and committed to particular stances vis-à-vis discursive contexts. The history 
of the emergence of the scholarly study of religion, “science of religion” 
(Religionswissenschaft), provides ample evidence of this, and to demonstrate 
this I will furnish two examples of the political nature of both religious 
mythmaking and scholarly mythmaking. 
 
3. ON DISCOURSE AND IDEOLOGY 
I use the term “discourse” in a slightly more expanded sense than the 
definition given in Tim Murphy’s article “Discourse” in the Braun/McCutcheon 
Guide to the study of religion (Murphy 2000a). In my usage, discourse is a 
simultaneous combination of a number of aspects. Discourse is the contents 
of a set of representations, whether linguistic, textual, or otherwise symbolic 
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(including ritual), characterised by a domain of topics that lends it some kind 
of identity (identified as such by the classificatory and taxonomic activity of the 
interpreter or “reader of discourse”); but discourse also includes the social 
location that forms the originary matrix for the particular invention of the set of 
representations; and it includes the social interests encompassed/ 
encapsulated in and giving rise to the set of representations; and it includes 
the logic governing the interrelations between these factors or aspects, as well 
as the institutionalisation of such “domained” representations in canons of 
tradition, schools of thought, habitus as habituated action, cultural and socio-
political-economic conventions, that is, as discursive formations. However, 
even though the phrase “originary context” may evoke singular, identifiable 
origins, discourse is a multivalent and “multi-origined” set of representations – 
“discourse comes from everywhere” as Judith Perkins once put it. Discourse, 
in effect, is the result of an ensemble of representation genres, from texts, 
rituals, everyday habits, traditions, state machinery and their function, high 
culture-low culture, entertainment, bodily dispositions and habitus in general, 
the built environment, et cetera. To understand discourse like this, means that 
to “read” discourse is to read it self-reflexively, namely in the consciousness 
and awareness of the interest-ladenness of the constructedness of the set of 
representations, as well as of the fact that the “reading of discourse” is itself a 
further instance of discourse, determined by its own set of terministic screens, 
social location, and social interests and logic. “Discourse reading” is therefore 
a multileveled activity, on both primary (first order) level and on the secondary 
(second order) level, to put it at its simplest. If one understands the reading of 
discourse to also be discourse then it should also be clear that the distinction 
between first order and second order of discourse is somewhat misleading. In 
a sense there is only first order discourse, or equally true, there is only second 
order discourse, since each discourse as a kind of language is a speaking of 
that language in the context of another language (Murphy 2000b). 
 So, to sum up: discourse is the sum of the institutionalised, multi-
origined set of representations, originating from social interests shaped by a 
certain social location, governed by a logic that binds it together into an 
identifiable identity, and “read” within the context of another discourse. If the 
issue at stake is the contest between discourses of Culture and Nature, of 
historicisation and mythmaking, then it is equally clear that we are dealing with 
scholarship and religious mythmaking as ideological realities.  
 In the course of history two main lines of thinking about ideology have 
emerged: the first is the “original” interpretation originating from Destut de 
Tracy, running via Marx and Engels, via the revolutionary movements of the 
20th century, and operative in thinkers such as Althusser and even Habermas. 
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This is the line that takes ideology to be the tool by which a hegemonic class 
occludes the operations of its exploitation of those members of society on 
lower power rungs of the social ladder. It is typically located in so-called 
“ideological state apparatuses”, and ideological critique means to unmask the 
processes of oppression at work. While there is much to say for this, and in a 
study of variable resistances to imperial regimes such as Christianity within 
the Roman Empire, where the imperial cult (not solely, but pre-eminently) 
played the role of an “ideological state apparatus”, this is an important facet of 
our understanding of the interplay of forces, nevertheless I prefer the more 
neutral interpretation of the term. This second line of thinking is to an extent 
embodied by Foucault, but see also the literature listed in Gary Lease’s essay 
“Ideology” in Guide to the study of religion (Lease 2000), as well as the work 
of Bruce Lincoln, and such Marxist literary critics as Terry Eagleton. Taking 
my bearings from this cluster of theorising I see ideology as a general 
characteristic of all social existence and communication. Ideology in this 
sense denotes the way in which all action, representation, and communicative 
interchange – thus, all social existence – are beholden to the interests we 
pursue as we jockey for position in the acquisition of cultural and social capital 
goods (“Society is a field of tension” – Bruce Lincoln). All (unreflexive) 
discourse is ideological in that it naturally or intuitively occludes the material 
basis of its existence, or the conditions for its existence – we tend to assume 
that the way we see and give value to reality is how things are, and then act 
on this projection of world in the construction of our world. Ideology in this 
sense needs to be distinguished from downright lying and cynical 
manipulation, although ideologues can be guilty of these as well. Lying and 
manipulation implies wilful and deliberate misrepresentation and misleading, 
and thus the deception is conscious, mostly. When myths and rituals are 
transmitted and enacted ostensibly for the symbolic meaning but, on closer 
inspection, for the maintenance of power/authority hierarchies, then they 
function as ideologies, and are then properly classified as ideological 
discourses. Such is also the case with textualised traditions, or with rhetorical 
interventions. Gary Lease formulated it thus: “All religion is ideology, but all 
ideology is not religion” (Lease 2000:445). He wanted to negate the place of 
such ideological systems as Marxism, Nazism, et cetera. in the class of 
phenomena that make up religion, but of course there is a lot of debate in 
scholarly circles on this point of definition to which I do not endeavour to give 
an answer here. The point I am making is that even as mythic discourse (i.e., 
that which characterise religious speech) is ideological, so too is scholarship 
on religion. 
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4. ON RELIGION: THE RECALIBRATION OF MYTH – 
CYBELE/MAGNA MATER IN ATHENS 
As an example of the earlier mentioned socio-political recalibrations within the 
religious field of “first-order myth”, I want to refer to the recent work by Mark 
Munn (2006), The Mother of the gods, Athens, and the tyranny of Asia: A 
study of sovereignty in ancient religion (A Joan Palevsky Book in Classical 
Literature) on the introduction of Cybele/Magna Mater in Athens in the fifth 
century BCE.9 
 The core argument of Mother of the gods deals with the circumstances 
surrounding the introduction of the cult of Cybele/Meter Megale (or, 
Kybaba/Kybebe, as she was known in Phrygia and Lydia) in Athens, from her 
initial rejection at the beginning of the fifth century to her arrival in Athens in 
the last decade of the fifth century BCE. Tracing these developments mainly 
through the eyes of Herodotus (but also other Greek writers – historians, 
poets, dramatists – as well as later writers from the imperial age and even 
later Antiquity, Munn sketches a picture of an ambiguous divinity whose shape 
and symbolic function are determined by the fluid historical, cultural, and 
political discourses that encoded the variously shifting Athenian and Greek 
adaptations to the flow of events in which they were caught up. In chameleon-
like fashion the “Mother” is variously Mother of the gods; consort of the chief 
deity; consort of the sovereign; fertility deity; seductress; virgin; upholder of 
customs, laws, and constitutions; and bearer of many masks across different 
religious cultures from ancient Persia, Media, Babylonia, Assyria, Lydia, 
Phrygia, Ionia to Attica and the Peloponnese. But it is exactly this facet that 
opens a window onto the discursive manufacturing of gods and its ideological 
underpinnings, and which Munn expertly uncovers in the course of his 
historical narrative and analysis. 
 Munn argues that the Mother of the gods formed the focal point for, and 
embodiment of, discourses about an ideology of tyranny and sovereignty 
(basileia) that ordered power relationships and was used in the construction of 
communal identity, worldview, and religion itself. Its first clear manifestation is 
seen in the eighth century BCE (Homeric epoch) Lydian kingdoms of Midas 
and Croesus, which inaugurated a legacy of tyranny understood as 
transgressive excess signifying divine justification of tyrannical rule. Not 
limited to Lydian and Phrygian political and religious culture, tyranny also 
marked the political culture of Greeks on the mainland and elsewhere. 
However, the fall of the Lydian kingdom to Achaemenid Persian hegemony, 
and the adoption of the ideology of tyranny by the Persians, forced a Greek 
                                                     
9 I am drawing here on my review of Munn’s book for Review of Biblical Literature (Van den 
Heever 2007). 
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reconsideration of how to respond to the aggressive claims of Persian 
sovereignty. While Greeks were not unfamiliar with tyrannical regimes of their 
own, the “Persian situation” opened up a space for debates about the nature 
of sovereignty and the institutionalisation of sovereignty in communal 
institutions rather than vesting this in powerful personalities, developments 
which saw Lydian-Phrygian-Persian style tyranny acquire the character of 
odious oppression in Greek representations of power exercise. In this process 
a key role is played by the symbols of authority, the gods, and how they were 
appropriated, rejected, and used.  
 The central event that defined the Athenian reaction is the account of 
the murder of the ambassador sent by Darius to Athens demanding 
recognition of Persian sovereignty, the Metragyrtes (= “beggar of the Mother”, 
the eunuch priest of the Mother of the gods at Sardis), which event unleashed 
a century-long history of revenge, warfare, shifting alliances (Athens, Sparta, 
the Ionian Greeks, even with the Persian satrapy in Asia Minor), and even 
intermittent peace treaties between sometime enemies. It is in the Athenian 
construction of the event – itself a fluid phenomenon – that the mythicising 
processes of interpretation of the significance of historical actions can be 
detected (the “political uses of myth,” so Bruce Lincoln): the choice for “the 
gods of the Greeks” as rallying cry for the construction of Greek or pan-
Hellenic identity in contra-distinction to the earlier regnant encompassing 
“pan-Asian” worldview; the construction of Europe and Asia as mutually 
exclusive identities; the recalibration of Greek gods (or Greek versions of the 
Mother) to embody opposing characteristics disallowing constructions of 
tyranny (features such as virginity in contrast to emphases on sexuality); yet, 
gradually, also the adoption of the Great Mother as act of appeasement for 
the murder of her ambassador in answer to the various calamities befalling 
Athens in the long conflict with Persia; the introduction to Athens of the cult of 
the Mother as Aristoboul, guarantor of “wise counsel” (i.e., as symbol of 
democratic deliberative harmony); and as the ever-ambiguous embodiment of 
both Greek aversion to tyranny as well as the recognition of the power and 
ideology of tyranny as underlying and feeding the Athenian empire in the 
exercise of its sovereignty and dominance of the Aegean Sea as maritime 
power. The Mother of the gods was an irresistible power (as Nemesis and 
Themis; as patron of sovereignty and carnivalesque nurturer, Demeter, 
Aphrodite, Rhea, and Ge) that had to be defined and controlled.  
 The march of the Great Mother through the Mediterranean world spans 
a long history. It starts with the deep-reaching roots of classical Greek 
conceptions of sovereignty and tyranny in seventh and sixth century Asian 
mythologies of power centred on Sardis and Gordium (the centres of the 
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Phrygian and the Lydian empires), and evidenced in the royal ideologies of 
the dynasties of Midas and the Mermnads (the dynasty of Croesus) with their 
mythologisation of the transgressive excesses of divine-human rulers as 
harbingers of paradisal wholeness and carnivalesque excess in a kind of 
Saturnalian golden age, with the concomitant spread of the Mother of the 
gods through the then-known oikoumene as the symbolic embodiment of the 
ideology and practices of Lydian tyranny. In the growing tensions and conflicts 
between Greeks and the kingdoms of Asia Minor, and then with the successor 
to the Lydian and Phrygian kingdoms – the Persian empire, the Mother of the 
Gods and attitudes towards her cult formed the focal point for the construction 
of mutually exclusive worldviews and identities of Asia and Europe and the 
division of the oikoumene into two separate domains of sovereignty. The bar 
was raised with the establishment of Persian sovereignty in Asia Minor and 
Persian appropriation of the ideology of Lydian tyranny and the effects this 
had on Persian-Greek interaction clearly delineated the various ways in which 
Greek recalibrations of divine identities answered developments in the political 
sphere. This is clearly demonstrated by the rhetoric operative in Herodotus’s 
account of the history of the introduction of the Great Mother to Athens as 
interwoven with his own analysis of the presence and effects of the hand of 
the god in the political vicissitudes of Athens as an element in the construction 
of Athenian self-awareness of their own “imperial” place in the oikoumene. 
When finally the Great Mother was introduced to Athens and incorporated into 
the society of city cults, it was in a very different guise to the way in which 
Greeks initially had got to know her as Asian goddess – now recalibrated with 
different characteristics, providing evidence of an Athenian accommodation to 
a world in which they shared sovereignty with Persian Asia. Thus the 
introduction of the cult of the Mother in effect constituted a kind of “religious 
peace treaty” with the Persians of Asia Minor. 
 A similar recalibration took place almost three hundred years later, in a 
Rome embroiled in a war with Carthage. The Roman transportation of the 
Great Mother (in the shape of her image, the black meteorite stone) from her 
home seat at Pessinus in Phrygian Galatia at the height of the second Punic 
war took place equally at a time of ambiguous evaluations of the outcome of 
the war, during a struggle for maritime supremacy (on Magna Mater in Rome, 
see Turcan 1996:28-74). This fact is significant in that it exhibits a similar 
appropriation to the Athenian recalibration of the Mother. That the Mother and 
her cult was severely constrained and controlled in Rome in an effort to 
contain the excesses associated with her cult, speaks volumes for dual 
Roman awareness of her efficacy in enabling imperial formation and control of 
the sea (as in the case of Athens two centuries before), as well as the 
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temptation to tyrannical power grabs inspired by the Mother – to be contained 
by the Republic still nominally beholden to democratic ideals (again, 
reminiscent of Athenian praxis of two centuries before). And in this the 
subsequent history of Rome is very much a replication of the attitudes and 
practices in contestation in Athens, as well as of the eventual fate of Athens 
and its democratic discourse. 
 The “triumphal march of Isis” through the Mediterranean world (Versnel 
1993) illustrates the ambiguities embodied by imperialised female deities even 
better: as represented in the Kymean aretalogy (IK Kyme 41) Isis is both 
tyrant and the destroyer of tyrants; both deliverer from tyranny and binding 
devotees in bonds of exclusive loyalty; as tyrant controls the sea and fate; and 
gives civilisation and the fruits of agriculture to the human race. As civiliser, as 
tyrant, as guarantor of a restored paradisal age, Isis indeed comes to function 
as an “Egyptian Great Mother”, something further demonstrated by her 
character as myrionyma – all the other female deities embodied. And it is no 
coincidence that she assumes the position of tutelary deity to the Flavians 
after 69 CE and remained the symbol of the presence of Roman sovereignty 
on the borders of the empire, a political formation the justification of which was 
premised on the restoration of the saeculum aureum, a mythical golden age. 
When later the virgin, the mother of God, God-bearer “Theotokos”, Queen of 
Heaven assumed a similar position in the Christian empire we can discern the 
remarkable persistence of myth in the eastern Mediterranean world from the 
seventh century BCE to the present day, variously expressed and represented 
to be sure, but with a consistency of ideology and symbolism that is truly 
remarkable.10 
 The history of the Mother of the Gods elegantly illustrates how ancient 
divinities were not static types, but rather expressions of cultural systems that 
responded to historical change, and through this the very important issue of 
the connection between religion, cosmogony and politics is raised. The way a 
society conceives sovereignty in the religious domain must be related in some 
way to the way it conceives sovereignty in other domains, as in politics. 
 
 
                                                     
10 On the development of the “imperial” Marian ideology, see especially Limberis (1994). 
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5. ON RELIGIOUS SCHOLARSHIP: THE MYTH OF 
MYSTERY RELIGIONS – CONCEIVING MYSTERIES AS 
MIRRORS OF CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOSITY11 
If “primary practitioners of religious discourse” can appropriate and recalibrate 
myth in a process of symbolic intervention as part of social discourse, 
religious scholarship, even scholarship purporting to be “historical-critical”, can 
similarly engage in appropriation and recalibration of myth, and thereby 
practise remythologisation, themselves thereby practising a kind of “first order 
mythmaking”. Mysteries/mystery religions – in the context of the history of 
religious scholarship a very special case and “discovery” of the religio-
historical scholarship of the nineteenth century – have had a fascinating 
career path through religious scholarship the past one and a half century. In 
the process the mysteries were transmogrified into contested images of 
religiosity relevant to the nineteenth century, and these still form the essence 
of portraits of the mysteries in contemporary scholarship. The mysteries were 
either examples of “personal religion” of “union with the deity” as answer to 
the decline in traditional religion,12 or a remnant of Roman Catholic-like 
ritualistic religiosity in an era of Protestant rationalism.13 
 A few examples of this enduring picture would suffice to demonstrate 
this trajectory: 
 
The mystery cults of the Hellenistic-Roman world were a product of 
the age, a response to the changing attitudes of individual and 
social conditions. Both the oriental cults that had penetrated the 
                                                     
11 For this discussion, I am drawing on material from my dissertation “‘Loose fictions and 
frivolous fabrications.’ Ancient fiction and the mystery religions of the early Imperial Era” (Van 
den Heever 2005:27-36). 
 
12 The allusion to contemporary commentary on religion in nineteenth century Europe is 
unmistakeable. 
 
13 In J G Frazer’s The golden bough: A study in magic and religion (originally appeared 
1890/1900/1907-1915, see the discussion in Smith, below) the putative decaying and 
revitalized vegetation – the vicissitudes of an incarnate “vegetative spirit” expressed in ritual – 
was expressed in the myth of a dying and rising god and this formed the core of the myth and 
cult of such diverse cults as that of Osiris, Adonis, Thammuz, Attis, Dionysus; Egyptian, 
Syrian, Babylonian, Phrygian, and Greek religion. Although Christianity itself is rarely 
mentioned in a comparative manner in this context, yet running as an undercurrent to these 
studies, for Frazer Christianity shared the myth and the mystery rituals with these cults, and 
represented the growing accommodation of a once-pure Christianity with the pagan Umwelt – 
“pagano-papist” apologetics: “Taken together, the coincidences of the Christian with the 
heathen festivals are too close and too numerous to be accidental. They mark the 
compromise which the Church in the hour of its triumph was compelled to make with its 
vanquished yet still dangerous rivals. The inflexible Protestantism of the primitive 
missionaries, with their fiery denunciations of heathendom, had been exchanged for the 
supple policy, the easy tolerance, the comprehensive charity of shrewd ecclesiastics ...” 
(Smith 1990:85-115, 116-144, the citation here from p 92 n 14). 
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Greek world and the old Greek cults were hellenized into mystery 
cults, mysteries, or mysteria, a Greek term that meant “initiation.” 
The term was applied to the cults in which membership depended 
upon the participation of the initiate in a personal ritual that resulted 
in the individual’s identification or close relationship with the deity of 
the cult ... [T]hree essential characteristics are common to all the 
mystery cults of the time: (1) a purification rite by which the initiate 
is granted admission and participation in the activity of the cult; (2) 
a sense of a personal relationship or communion with the deity or 
deities of the cult; and (3) the hope or promise of a life of blessed-




At the end of her discussion of the mystery religions, Tripolitis would conclude 
that it was the universal and egalitarian character of the mysteries that 
accounted for their widespread popularity:  
 
They were individualistic, addressing the spiritual needs of the 
individual, and they also provided the devotees with meaningful 
fellowship with individuals who possessed the same knowledge of 
salvation. Last, they provided a personal, closer relationship to the 
divine, protection from the adversities of this life, and the hope of 




In a similar vein, in his magisterial exposé of the Hellenistic age, Peter Green 
has argued in Alexander to Actium (Green 1990, esp 586-601): the mysteries 
of the Hellenistic-Roman era were part of an interconnected complex of 
phenomena such as the flourishing of “foreign cults,” the flowering of oracles, 
astrology, and magic – the mysteries were symptomatic of a descent into the 
irrational.14 All these were epiphenomena of developments in the area of 
politics and society. As the city-states of classical antiquity lost their autonomy 
in the Hellenistic period, the experience of political impotence translated into 
personal surrender to superhuman power (whether political or transcendental 
in the form of Tyche, or other less elevated but no less malignant divine 
beings). But now, with the decline of the city-states of old also went hand in 
                                                     
14 Green cites the famous work of E R Dodd, The Greeks and the irrational (originally 
published 1951) at the start of this section. The work of Dodd was immensely influential to a 
generation of scholars of Graeco-Roman religion, and his legacy endured even longer. 
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hand the decline of traditional polis religion,15 and this opened the gate for a 
proliferation of private religious clubs and associations where the old polis-
derived identity was replaced by a new communal identity built on communal 
worship and shared banquets access to which was granted by initiation 
(Green 1990:589). In these kinds of Ersatz-communities the solitude of urban 
existence was exorcised in the exhilaration of emotional enthusiasm,16 in 
which salvation in the hereafter was promoted as remedy to the ills of this life 
(Green 1990:589). Together with magic, astrology, oracles, and epiphanies 
the mysteries constituted alternative societies, rites of passage into “the 
utopias of the desperate.”17 Here again it is the socially constitutive function of 
the mysteries, but in its context conceived to be part of the slide into 
superstition, utopian fantasies, and the irrational, that is highlighted as the 
remedy for the lost individual in search of salvation.  
 In his overview of the Hellenistic world, F W Walbank (1992) too links 
the rise in mystery religions, and influx of oriental religions to socio-political 
developments. 
 
But many new religious developments were a response to changes 
in individual attitudes and to new social conditions. With the 
reduced power of the city-states went a decline in men’s confidence 
in their traditional cults and a growing interest in mystery religions 
and this was encouraged by a falling off in the rationalism that had 
been characteristic of much fifth-century sophistic thought. The 
mystery cults involved secret initiation ceremonies and promised 
individual salvation ... This trend towards revelation, irrational and 
emotional ... (my emphasis – GvdH). 
 
(Walbank 1992:218) 
                                                     
15 “Were not the Olympian deities still officially worshipped? Did not every polis retain its 
traditional divine patron? All true; and yet the image had grown dead and hollow, eaten away 
at the heart by the boreworms of political impotence, creeping secularism, social 
fragmentation, loss of cohesive identity. Cities and empires had become too vast and 
heterogeneous to give adequate psychological support to inheritors of the old, local polis 
tradition: their society was no longer either integrated or manageable” (Green 1990:587). 
 
16 “Indeed, the second century [BCE] (for reasons that by now should be clear enough) seems 
to have ushered in a general wave of religious emotionalism throughout the Mediterranean; if 
bien-pensant conservatives expressed shock, the poor, the desperate, and the dispossessed 
were (in every sense of the word) ecstatic. Initiatory rites for Isis, Mithras, and Cybele all 
seem to have been developed during the late Hellenistic period, at a time when, for an ever-
increasing proportion of the populace, bleak prospects on this earth made the promise of 
salvation in the hereafter look peculiarly attractive ...” (Green 1990:591-592). 
 
17 “What is of rather more interest is the fact that such an elaborately traumatic enactment of 
rebirth should have found so ready a market. The age was hungry for visions, for miracles, for 
knowledge of what lay beyond the boundaries of nature and reason ...” (Green 1990:600, 
595). 
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And he continues: “More important to the ordinary man and woman were the 
oriental cults, especially those of Egypt, which increasingly penetrated the 
Greek world to fill the gap left by the collapse of belief in the indigenous gods 
... In particular cults offering a personal contact with the divinity or the promise 
of personal survival after death were especially popular” (my emphasis – 
GvdH) (Walbank 1992:220-221). 
 What is common to these kinds of conceptions of the mysteries are in 
the first instance the putative individualism characterising the mysteries, that 
is, their character as receptacles for alienated individuals; in the second place, 
their offering of salvation, conceived as (mostly but not exclusively) the 
overcoming of death; in the third place, union with divinity; and finally, their 
character as irrational, enthusiastic (or charismatic), and superstitious. Of 
course these portrayals of the mysteries did not suddenly appear out of 
nowhere, and for the purposes of this essay, this is the interesting and crucial 
question. These portrayals evidence the effective history of earlier scholarship 
on the mysteries, itself deeply implicated in the birth and rise of the study of 
religion as science.18 Gustav Anrich in his then groundbreaking work, 
delineated the ‘religious meaning’ of the mystery cults thus: the goal of the 
mysteries is the attainment of stria guaranteed by the initiation rite, and this 
stria consists of ‘blessed immortality’ in the afterlife, as well as a new life on 
earth in union with and under the protection of the particular deity (Anrich 
[1894] 1990:47). Next in importance to immortality is the idea of purification 
(Entsühnung/ Kathartik) effected in a wide variety of rituals from water 
lustrations to blood baptisms like the taurobolium and kriobolium (Anrich 
1990:51-54). Essential to the initiation into the mystery is the fact that the 
mysteries do not only effect a subjective experience of unity with the divine, 
but the rite also effects the objective attainment of the realities constituting the 
stria, so that the mysts has now received the character indelebilis of 
sacratus, renatus, and tauroboliatus (Anrich 1990:54).19 The benefits accrued 
                                                     
18 For a good overview of the rise of Religionswissenschaft, “Science of Religion,” as a 
discipline and the effect of its embeddedness in European culture at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century on its origins, see Kippenberg (2002), as well as (among others of the 
included essays in the cited volume) Rudolph (1991), and Plantinga (1991). The discovery of 
irrationalism, the solitary individual, the identification of the mysteries as nature and 
vegetation religions, and the enthusiastic/ecstatic nature of this religiosity was, arguably, an 
epiphenomenon of the cultural period known as Romanticism. Although Romanticism as 
cultural movement lasted only about three decades up to about the 1830s, its effects were felt 
much longer. It can be argued that the picture of late Antiquity that emerged in scholarship 
and had become the standard portrayals by the end of the century, was the result of a 
romantic envisioning of the world. 
 
19 But note the unmistakeable influence of a Protestant interpretation of sacramental ritual in 
the differentiation between subjective experience and objective effect, the latter being 
evidence of a superstitious and magical view of ritual, characteristic of Catholicism, the 
direction into which the mysteries developed. The Catholic Church accommodated itself to 
late Antique religiosity as it became the state church. 
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from initiation into a mystery do not preclude multiple initiation into other 
mysteries, the reason being the increasingly magical-superstitious view taken 
of the mysteries, which prompted the initiands to seek ever more secure 
guarantees for the stria in multiple initiations and purifications (Anrich 
1990:55). Lastly, Anrich highlights the development of religious, mystery 
communities as societies within society (Anrich 1990:56). Richard 
Reitzenstein added to these the interiorisation of the mysteries as a growing 
tendency towards the “faith” of mysteriosophy,20 and the increasing 
syncretism effected by the mysteries (Reitzenstein [1927] 1956:240-242). 
 The path to this construction of the mysteries was paved earlier in the 
nineteenth century. The emerging picture of the religious history of the ancient 
Near East was an answer to cultural, social, and political developments in 
Europe, especially Romanticism.21 Romanticism as style and as cultural 
movement itself was a reaction to two centuries of rationalism and increasing 
industrialisation. The alienation resulting from these social and political 
upheavals led to the birth of history in a two-fold sense: the birth of the 
modern scholarly discipline of history and history as a popular sense of a 
longing for a long-lost paradisal time of wholeness.22 On the plane of popular 
culture this ranged from rediscoveries of the “merrie England” of the Middle 
                                                     
20 So clearly seen in the Hermetic and Gnostic material, the end point of the trajectory from 
Eleusis in classical Antiquity to the Gnosticism of late Antiquity, cf Reitzenstein ([1927] 
1956:242-243). Again, the tendency is unmistakeable, the mysteries function as foil or 
counterpoint for the religio-historical conceptionalising of early Christianity, a point also 
underscored by Kippenberg (2002:118-119). In the history of religio-historical scholarship on 
early Christianity it is especially with reference to Paul and the Pauline tradition that the 
mystery religions have been useful as illuminating “background,” see above. It is not difficult 
to understand why. The Pauline language of “mystery,” the particular portrayal of baptism, 
and the complex of expressions of unity with Christ (in Christ, with Christ, etc) as dying with 
and rising with Christ, not to mention Pauline charismatic spirituality, have served as the 
justification for reading of the Pauline literature against the ‘background’ of both Gnosticism 
and mystery religions. 
 
21 I draw on the analysis of Fleming (1995:511–545). 
 
22 See Fleming (1995:543): “Above all, the romantic view included a sense of history. Creating 
imaginary places far apart from workaday situations proved a welcome refuge from the 
increasingly industrialized and mechanized world ... However, ‘Any time but now, and any 
place but here’ became the battle cries of romanticism.” See also Plantinga (1991:157-158): 
“The primary characteristic of Romanticism, van der Leeuw thought, is longing (Verlangen), 
This continual and insatiable longing is for another world, for anything other present, 
condemning reality ... In thus holding that Romanticism and religion bear certain unmistakable 
resemblances, van der Leeuw meant that Romanticism and religion are similarly inclined to 
long for past golden ages and to dream of alternative realities and states. ‘Es war sonst 
wirklich besser’. Homesickness and mourning for a past age are the fundamental Romantic 
feelings ... The search becomes restless, frenzied. The longing cannot be satisfied and thus 
tears become unavoidable and melancholy predominant. To alleviate the situation, the 
Romantic idealizes some place or state: Italy, India, the North America, fantasy worlds, the 
forest, night, the depths of the earth. Ultimately, the Romantic attempts to heal the 
brokenness and to satisfy the endless longing in his life by seeking an immediate unity, by 
seeking the infinite in the finite or the divine in nature” (my emphasis, GvdH). 
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Ages (in fiction as well as in cultural movements such as the Arts and Crafts 
movement), to the wholesale revival of Gothic in architecture and literature, 
and followed by Romanesque, and Byzantine styles, as well as classical 
revivals of Greek and Roman styles.23 Simultaneously this period also saw the 
wholesale importation of the Orient into the “imaginative repertory” of the arts 
and architecture (Fleming 1995:534-535), and this at a time when discoveries 
in the field of archaeology and text collection and translation began to 
transport the exotic Orient into the historical scholarly consciousness of 
religious origins. 
 Apart from these developments, the period also saw the birth of the 
individual as hero: “Romantic social and political thought viewed the status of 
people as individuals first and foremost and as members of society 
secondarily. The romantic period was also the age of the emancipation of the 
individual and the era of the great hero attained such heights by personal 
efforts” (Fleming 1995:531).24 Finally, Romanticism also entailed the 
deification of nature in art as yet another way of expressing longing for the lost 
pastoral idyll (Fleming 1995:537). In religio-historical studies this found 
expression in the discovery of the category of salvation religion (Kippenberg 
2002:120ff). Salvation religion was understood to indicate a kind of world-
negation (or Weltverneinung, as Hermann Siebeck formulated it) (Kippenberg 
2002:121). In a context of the merging of Christianity with industrialised 
society, salvation religion became a culture-critical and philosophical term with 
which to postulate the autonomy of religion. As Kippenberg comments on 
Ernst Troeltsch: “Religion was thus something other than an ethical ideal; it 
was the basis of practiced subjectivity. The autonomy of religion and the 
irreducibility of the individual were two sides of the same coin. Only religion 
can protect culture from a permanent descent into materialism and save the 
human personality” (Kippenberg 2002:122-123) (my emphasis – GvdH). In 
these (re)constructions of mysteries religio-historical scholars constructed the 
mysteries of the Graeco-Roman world in terms of Romantic values. And 
furthermore, the more resolutely Christianity was interpreted as a historical 
phenomenon embedded in its contemporary context, the more its defining 
categories emerged in religio-historical view to express a distance from the 
world: eschatology, apocalypticism, mysticism, and asceticism (Kippenberg 
2002:123).  
                                                     
23 In part, the revival of Gothic was exactly in answer to the French empire of Napoleon, and 
formed the basis for a national English style, see Fleming (1995:544). 
 
24 Compare also: “All this was, perhaps, a positive assertion of the diminishing self in the face 
of a growing organization of society under collective control” (Fleming 1995:531). The artist as 
hero exemplified the importance of emotion over reason, of enthusiasm over restraint, of 
inspiration over rational argumentation. 
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 So here we have, in the worldview of Romanticism – in the lost and 
longing individuals, enthusiasm, irrationalism and possession, a return to 
nature as the fount of religion, a heightened clamour for the (distant) past – 
the birth of the characteristic picture of the mysteries. As Plantinga (1991:159) 
says: “Given that the birth of the history of religion as a field of study followed 
not long after the demise of Romanticism in the nineteenth century, and that 
the former is in some sense a product of the latter, might there be more than 
an accidental relationship between the two?” All the famous names in the 
newly founded discipline of Religionsgeschichte were found in the gallery of 
Romanticism: Gerardus van der Leeuw, Johan Huizinga (Kuiper 1991), 
Schleiermacher, Max Müller, C P Tiele, Chantepie de la Saussaye, Nathan 
Söderblom, Rudolf Otto, Joachim Wach, and Friederich Heiler (Rudolph 
1991:151-152),25 as well as the (eccentric and infamous) Jane Harrison 
(Schlesier 1991, esp pp 232-235).26 
 This was the context against which the work of figures such as J G 
Frazer27 and Otto Pfleiderer28 gain in significance. Both traced the origins of 
Mediterranean and oriental religions (and thus the mysteries) to an origin in 
vegetative religion of a dying and rising god as the expression of seasonal 
cycles of nature, and this view was hugely influential due to the influence of 
the Pan-Babylonian School at the beginning of the twentieth century.29  
 However much the ancient and classical mysteries may have been 
founded on such an originary myth expressing seasonal cycles in the 
metaphor of dying and rising gods (and this is not certain), the fact is – as 
                                                     
25 The establishment of Science of Religion linked up with the theology of Schleiemacher: 
“Religionswissenschaft is zwar überlieferungskritisch in ihrer philologisch-historischen und 
quellenkritischen Methode, die mit entzaubernder Wirkung auf alle religiösen Dokumente, 
seien sie kanonischen oder heiligen Charakters, anwendet, aber in ideologischen 
Grundfragen ist sie theologisch oder religionsphilosophisch im eben genannten Sinne 
orientiert” Rudolph (1991:152). One can now immediately detect the origins of Otto’s 
mysterium tremendum et fascinans, in fact, as Rudolph puts it, this provenance of 
Religionswissenschaft turned it into a theologia naturalis Rudolph (1991:154). 
 
26 Harrison played a leading role in the Myth and Ritual school, and was famous for her 
writings on the history of Greek religion, formulating a view of the origins of Greek religion and 
the mysteries in nature religion, or vegetative cults. 
 
27 In his oft-republished The golden bough. 
 
28 Various works: Das Christusbild des urchristlichen Glaubens in religionsgeschichtlicher 
Beleuchtung, and Die Entstehung des Christentums, and issued in English as well. 
 
29 The Pan-Babylonian School saw myth as essentially cyclical, following an “astronomical 
Babylonian pattern,” or a “seasonal Canaanite pattern” Smith (1990:85-115). Hugely 
influential and hugely controversial: a history of scholarship in Christian history and New 
Testament literature was devoted to the refutation of these theories in order to insulate 
Christianity from these supposed influences or genealogical relations, the rhetorical 
techniques of which form the subject matter of Smith’s (in itself hugely influential) book. 
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Jonathan Z Smith so cogently argued, repeatedly – that the myths at issue are 
not static nor repetitions of the eternally recurring, to use a phrase made 
famous by Mircea Eliade. As narrative discourse qua form and narration they 
are inherently rhetorical, that is they are rhetorical interventions within 
particular contexts.30 And as, again qua Smith, we deal with religions in 
constant change and development, we are dealing in the imperial era with 
“archaic Mediterranean religions in their Late Antique phases,” that is with 
“historical processes of reinterpretation, with tradition” (Smith 1990:106-107). 
Far from having in the mysteries a-historic religions with static worldviews and 
myth, we are looking at adapting traditions, the vicissitudes of gods and the 
ritual celebration of participation in these vicissitudes as products of the 
imperial era from the mid-first century onwards, and in the scholarly 
constructions of the historical phenomenon of the mysteries we similarly 
encounter these as products of nineteenth and early twentieth century 
mythmaking. 
 This last remark brings me back to the initial statement, and 
presupposition, this paper started from, namely that both the “original” 
religious production as a field of mythmaking, and scholarship on that religious 
production are social and political commentaries – are discourses in the sense 
I delineated before, and in this regard it is necessary to keep in mind that the 
two sets of examples – the cult of the Mother of the Gods/Cybele/Magna 
Mater, and the mysteries of the Graeco-Roman world – are indeed intimately 
linked in that the cult of Cybele/Magna Mater indeed featured large in the 
scholarly conceptualisation of the mysteries in nineteenth and twentieth 
century scholarship. 
 
6. WHERE THE TWO MYTHIC DISCOURSES MEET: THE 
FUNCTION OF SCHOLARSHIP 
While I have put the case for seeing both religious production and scholarship 
on religion as mythmaking endeavours, nevertheless, I also hold that the two 
are not simply identical, or at least, do not function on exactly the same level. 
Implied in Bruce Lincoln’s “Theses on method” is the concept of distance, and 
this “distance” or distancing positioning towards religious production is the 
operative space for an interpretive analytic. The latter is, however, not 
                                                     
30 See the critique of this type of explanation of myth and ritual in the essays of Jonathan Z 
Smith, where he clearly overturns this view by showing how myths and rituals are to be 
understood as social performances grounded in, and elicited by, specific social 
circumstances. As Smith puts it in the Introduction to his essay volume Map is not territory 
(Smith 1978:xi): “I have come to insist that it is not sufficient to merely name a text; rather, it is 
necessary both to locate a text within a history of tradition and to provide some sort of 
explanation for the processes of continuity and change (my emphasis, GvdH).” 
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understood as a decontextualised, disembodied, objective stance but as an 
intensely political participation in the construction of discourse (understood as 
the multileveled construction of lived reality and identity). Lincoln himself, in 
his recent work, has theorised the role of religious discourse as the 
hegemonic authorising institution in the triangulation with aesthetics (the field 
of value and taste) and morality (the field of practice) (Lincoln 2000:409-22; 
Lincoln 1998:55-69; Lincoln 2003, esp ch 4-6). In line with the history of the 
term “culture” in Western consciousness since the 18th century, but especially 
since the work of Matthew Arnold, “culture” is understood here as a site of 
social and political positioning, a site of contention, in other words: the political 
toil of imagining ourselves as positioned in a specific manner vis-á-vis all other 
imagined communities, and doing so drawing on a multitude of symbolic 
interventions in order to effect and maintain this positioning and identity.31  
 To put it simply: while we are all political agents, I now see the scholar 
of religion as a political commissar-cum-analyst-commentator, after the 
analogy of the authoritative sports commentator: while involved with the game 
and the public industry of the sport (and she/he may actually be quite a 
proficient player of the game), nevertheless as analyst-commentator does not 
take part in the game at hand itself. Rather, as biased32 analyst-commentator 
she/he shapes public construction of the event through analysis, explanation, 
and evaluation of the game, though filtered through his/her localised 
perspective and loyalties. It is because of these localised perspectives and 
loyalties (which guarantee the commentator’s committed connection to the 
game) that the commentator enters the fray of constructing the game by 
adding an authoritative analytical voice to all the others, and in doing so, help 
make or break reputations, perceptions regarding proficiency and 
gamesmanship, and may even contribute in the long run to team selections 
and evolving game plans. Although I use the image of “authoritative analyst-
commentator”, one should understand that “authoritative” is not an 
unproblematic or simple term to use in this connection. The “analyst-
commentator” is not authoritative simply by virtue of being a commentator. 
Authority needs to be constructed, and the analyst-commentator authorised in 
order to effectively play this political role I have sketched out above.33 Such 
                                                     
31 On culture as a conflictual term (that is, denoting conflict), see (Eagleton 1983:24); Spillman 
(2002:1-16); in general the works of Bourdieu and Lincoln cited earlier. 
 
32 That is, referring to the political aspect. 
 
33 In Lincoln’s book, Authority: Construction and Corrosion (Lincoln 1994), three authorising 
“media” are distinguished, namely authorising objects, times, and places which endow 
speakers and actors with authority to act and speak. In the metaphor employed here I have 
creatively played with these and contextualised them with a view to their use in my metaphor. 
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authorising takes on multiple forms, from gaining expertise in the game and 
being recognised as expert (in the context of this discussion about religious 
scholarship, this would entail academic study and recognition as researcher), 
to occupying legitimised channels of communication (e.g., a nationally 
syndicated slot on some mass medium; or in the context of our discussion 
here, publishing in highly rated research publications, being variously deferred 
to as an expert in the field). Depending on which side of the dominant 
discourse about the field of the game the analyst-commentator finds 
him/herself, the commentator either constructs/maintains authority, or 
contributes to its corrosion, in which case the analyst-commentators functions 
as an agent provocateur. 
 Scholarship is also implicated in social formation, mythmaking, and 
worldview construction, or, after the above analogy – religious game-making. 
But what distinguishes scholarly production is the fact that, ideally, scholars 
make productive use of the distance towards the production of religion to 
which they are uniquely equipped, that is to say: “in” in an “out” manner, “out” 
in an “in” manner. In this sense the function of the scholar of religion is to 
denaturalise, demythologise, and demystify the discursive practices that led to 
the construction of religion or a specific religion as well as the discursive 
practices embodied in scholarly constructions, interpretations and theorising, 
or as is increasingly being asserted for the study of religion, to “historicise 
tradition” (see on this Engler & Grieve 2005).  
 It is in the nature of religion as an ideology to hide its own rhetoricity or 
social interests. The scholar has to expose these (in the sense of illuminate, 
that is, bringing to light – making visible), for only then can a religious public 
(“religious game players”) begin to truly understand what happens in the 
religious game and what religion does to them, and can they begin to accept 
responsibility for the religion they construct. This is best done by adopting a 
specific kind of “outsider viewpoint”, namely that of a politically committed 
agent provocateur and saboteur, redescribing the phenomenon by means of 
foreign terminology and theoretical frameworks.34 Arguing like this resurrects 
the old debate of insider versus outsider viewpoints: which is to be privileged? 
As one starts to reflect on the new and radically different picture of Christian 
origins that is beginning to emerge in studies of early Christianity, it is clear 
that it is only once we cast off the legacy of the combined Luke/Acts-Eusebius 
portrait of early Christian history that real progress is made in accounting for 
the emergence and formation of Christianity as a historical phenomenon. 
                                                     
34 I use the term “foreign”, but extrinsic or etic would also do. “Foreign” at least has the ring of 
strangeness, over-the-horizonness, to it and as such implies much more of a distance than 
the rather abstract terms “extrinsic” or “etic”. It is the distance I want to emphasise, 
“exaggerating here in the direction of truth.” 
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Earlier studies in church history were all beholden to the ideological interests 
of Christian imperial mythmaking, with all the disastrous effects this has on the 
history of the world and of humankind, so sharply described by Burton Mack 
(Mack 2001:177-193). Scholarship forbids insulating a historically privileged 
viewpoint from scrutiny. 
 In this regard, one cannot do scholarship on religion by avoiding 
questions of theory and discourse analysis, for since the past 30 years or so, 
all scholarship of necessity has to have the character also of metatheoretical 
reflection. One cannot read scholarly literature – and the Bible – as if the texts 
concur with the reality they speak about. All texts are essentially rhetorical 
interventions, which one needs to interpret before one can even begin to deal 
with the subject matter they speak about. Therefore, all scholarship moves by 
way of a dual procedure: to interpret the object as well as to interpret the 
interpretation of the object. 
 Thus, as a critical discourse, the field of scholarly production is an 
emancipatory project. While the conceptualisation underlying this paper is 
derived from Marxist studies and symbolic sociology, it is also closely related 
to Critical Theory and its aim of emancipation. Critical Theory became famous 
in the work of the so-called Frankfurt School (roughly late 1920s to 1960s in 
Germany and later elsewhere) and since the 1960s in the work of Jürgen 
Habermas. Described minimally as an interested “moment” in a transformative 
practice directed toward creating a more humane world, the aim of Critical 
Theory is to emancipate humans from the ideological distortions that enable 
the oppression of people. While classical Critical Theory shies away from 
providing a positive definition of the envisaged utopia (it is called “utopian 
pessimism”) for the (good) reason that all erected utopias carry in themselves 
the propensity to renewed oppression, nevertheless the emancipatory function 
lies in its aim to inculcate critical discourse analysis in free social agents or 
social participants. What is meant by this? It is recognised that members of 
society are culturally programmed by cultural media and social institutions (or 
discursive formations) to be insensitised to injustice and unequal distributions 
of power and power-effects. Further, by means of what is called 
“technologisation” and “instrumentalisation” of reason, social participants are 
equipped to be proficient actors within the hegemonic confines of a particular 
cultural dispensation. Even scholarship is co-opted in the process by the 
establishment of canons of scholarship and validation processes that, while 
on the surface seemingly promoting deeply penetrating explorations and 
investigations, nevertheless serve to maintain the general uncritical 
acceptance of the cultural dispensation. Critical thinking and critique, in this 
context, means to theorise positionality in the unequal, multifariously 
structured dissipation of power and power-effects, and to theorise it in such a 
Undoing the sleights of hand 
962  HTS 63(3) 2007 
way as to bring to light the manner in which discourse as world-construction 
and the practices that flow from it, are results of ideologically laden, interested 
social positionality. The value of Critical Theory as a kind of discourse 
analysis, then, lies in its impulse towards enabling transcendence beyond the 
conditioning determinants of our social location and culture, it is a schooling 
beyond mere proficiency in achieving predetermined intellectual and practical 
goals. In this sense critique becomes a kind of activism, and for us, then, 
there is essentially no difference between theory and practice.35  
 Enfin, the toil of scholarly production finds its true value, I would 
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